Introduction
Market prices reflect the true value of goods and services only for people who engage in trade given those prices. Understanding the value of goods for those who do not trade is more complicated for there is no observable, subjective value measure. The same complication is true for goods with missing markets. Individual behaviour may seem non-optimal from an economic point of view if we use inappropriate value measures, as did the behaviour of maize farmers in Mexico after NAFTA, when they increased maize production in spite of decreasing prices. I develop an agricultural household model to derive household specific subjective values (i.e. "shadow prices") of non-marketed farm products that can be estimated econometrically. This model extends the agricultural household literature with missing markets and explains why subsistence farmers may allocate resources in ways that cannot be explained by conventional analyses using market prices. Empirical application of the model in the context of subsistence farmers of traditional maize in Mexico provides policy implications for conservation of maize landraces and makes a case for de-facto conservation in their center of diversity.
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In the next section, I provide some background on the concept of shadow prices and its use in studying agricultural households with missing markets, and on the conservation of crop genetic diversity (CGD). In Section 3, I develop the theoretical model to derive household specific shadow prices of farmers' non-marketed crop. In Section 4, I describe data and estimate the shadow prices of traditional maize for subsistence farmers in Mexico.
I also analyze the determinants of the difference between shadow and market prices to derive I thank to Edward Taylor and Steve Boucher for very useful comments and suggestions. All mistakes are mine. I also thank to Center on Rural Economies of the Americas and Pacific Rim (REAP) and Program for the Study of Economic Change and Sustainability in Rural Mexico (PRECESAM) for letting me use this unique data set.
A landrace is a crop cultivar or animal breed that evolved with and has been genetically improved by traditional agriculturalists, but has not been influenced by modern breeding practices (Hoisington et al., 1999) . 
Background
The theoretical literature on shadow prices establishes that the value of goods and services not traded in markets can be measured with their shadow prices, which result from internal equilibria for each individual or household (Becker, 1974) . For such goods, market prices fail to represent value to guide individuals' decisions. The agricultural household literature with missing markets uses shadow prices to explain farmers' responses -or the lack of itto changes in market conditions (Singh et al., 1986; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994; de Janvry et al., 1991; Taylor and Adelman, 2003) . While most of these studies used market prices to value agricultural output, both de Janvry et al. (1991) and Taylor and Adelman (2003) analyze farmer decisions under missing product markets and represent the value of the constrained food crop with a shadow price instead of market price. Although they define the missing market as household specific, their simulation methods do not allow for the estimation of household specific shadow prices.
Imperfect substitutability between household labor and hired labor, creates a missing market for household labor and results in shadow wages that are higher than market wages. Jacoby (1993) developed a method to econometrically estimate the resulting household specific shadow wages. This method has been employed by a number of papers in the literature on the labor supply of farm households (Skoufias, 1994; Barrett et al., 2005) .
Although these papers improve our understanding of farm households' labor supply under missing markets, they do not consider the possibility of a missing market for some crops and value farmers' output at market prices.
The reason why market prices may not represent the true value of subsistence crops can be a special type of missing market. In the light of recent developments in the study of farmers' crop choices in centers of diversity, we can think of a crop as a bundle of multiple characteristics farmers pay attention to when choosing what to cultivate. These characteristics include production attributes (e.g. plant strength, resistance to pests and disease, ear length, flowering time, adaptability to certain environments), consumption attributes (e.g. ease of shelling and processing, taste, color, suitability for certain dishes), subjective importance farmers place on their seed which may have provided subsistence to the family for decades, as well as other non-market benefits farmers get from farm production (Brush and Meng, 1998; Smale et al., 2001; Edmeades et al., 2004; Badstue et al., 2006; Dyer-Leal et al., 2002) . Empirical evidence suggests that, even if another farmer in the same village has the same variety, the difficulty in trying to identify whether that farmer is going to take good care of the crop, or whether that crop will satisfy all of the farmer's different needs imposes risks and transaction costs on the farmer (Badstue et al., 2006) . Therefore, the farmer values his own crops higher than those in the market, which creates a missing market for what otherwise would be a perfect substitute for the farmer's subsistence crop.
In this case, it is the household specific shadow price instead of market price that guides farmer's choices.
The endogenously determined shadow price captures the above mentioned non-market values that define farmers' incentives to cultivate a certain crop variety. Therefore shadow prices can be used to improve the efficiency of on-farm conservation programs by targeting areas where farmers have higher incentives to continue cultivating traditional crops.
Although Dyer-Leal and Yunez-Naude (2003) acknowledge the need to use shadow prices instead of market prices to value traditional crops with high non-market values, there are no studies to explicitly account for household-specific shadow prices for subsistence crops.
I fill this gap by estimating and analyzing the determinants of household specific shadow prices of traditional maize for subsistence farmers in rural Mexico.
Understanding the determinants of farmers' valuation of their crops in centers of crop domestication and diversity is particularly important for the conservation of traditional crop varieties. These varieties are the main sources of CGD because of millennia old processes of evolution and farmer selection to suit them to heterogenous soil and climate conditions, as well as to satisfy demand for various consumption characteristics (Liu et al., 2003; Berthaud and Gepts, 2004) . Resulting genetic diversity is one of the most important material inputs of crop breeding research that improves yields and resistances of the world's food crops (Koo et al., 2003) . While conservation of CGD has traditionally been in the form of frozen conservation in gene banks, crop breeders increasingly agree that on-farm conservation that allows crops to continue their evolution in their natural environments is a complement to conservation in gene banks (Brush, 1989; Bellon and Smale, 1998) . On-farm conservation relies on farmers' incentives to continue cultivating these crops and these incentives are valuable in designing and targeting efficient conservation programs (Bellon and Smale, 1998) .
Whether farmers' incentives are based on market prices or shadow prices is crucial for understanding farmers' responses to changes in economic environment and for improving the efficiency of on-farm conservation programs.
I use a nationally representative agricultural household data from rural Mexico to estimate shadow prices of traditional maize and analyze their determinants. Mexico is the center of domestication of maize, where the history of maize goes as far back as 7000 BC (Dowswell et al., 1996) . Farmers have been selecting and cross breeding native maize varieties since then to fit them to their needs and heterogenous agro-ecological conditions.
2 Consequently, Mexico hosts the largest CGD of maize in the world with 59 different races that are valuable inputs for crop breeders to continue improving the worlds' most widely used food grain (Yunez-Naude and Taylor; Berthaud and Gepts, 2004) . The results of this research can be used to design and target effective conservation programs for this important crop.
Theoretical Model
In this section, I develop a model to understand farmer's land, labor and input allocation decisions across different crops (a subsistence crop and a cash crop) and activities (farm production, off-farm work and leisure) to maximize his utility subject to a full income constraint and a market constraint for the subsistence crop. This market constraint is such that the farmer cannot buy the same product he produces; hence, the production of this crop equals consumption and sales -if any. I assume that the unobserved quality of others' crops and non-market benefits from farming one's own crop discussed above translate into imperfect substitutability of the market purchased crop for the farmer's subsistence crop.
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The farmer produces two crops using labor, a purchased input and a given amount of land (A). The markets for the cash crop and labor are perfect, hence the farmer can buy and sell these at market prices. There are no land markets, and he divides his land between the subsistence crop and the cash crop. He also decides how to allocate resources like labor and other inputs across different crops and activities to maximize utility.
Let Q i denote the quantity produced of the crop i, where i = a, c, and a identifies the subsistence crop and c identifies the cash crop. X c , X m and X l are respectively the amount 2
In an exhibition at the Museo de Culturas Populares in 1982, 600 different food preparations were documented, many of which require different types of maize (Brush and Chauvet, 2004) . 
is the total labor used in production of crop i, θ is the proportion of land cultivated with the subsistence crop and Z is a vector of household characteristics. The farmer's problem is given by:
where p j denotes the market prices of consumption goods and purchased input identified with subscripts j = a, c, m, I; and W denotes exogenous transfers.
Equation 1 is the cash constraint, which indicates that the total expenditure on the consumption of cash crop, market good and purchased input needs to be less than or equal to the value of marketed surplus plus net labor income and exogenous transfers. Equations 2 and 3 are production functions for Q a and Q c , where the land endowment is normalized such that A = 1, and q a and q c are the per hectare production functions that are concave in labor and purchased input. Equation 4 is the time constraint, whereT is the household's time endowment. I assume that the marginal utility from the first unit of consumption of all goods is very large c, m, l) , hence the household has to consume positive amounts of all consumption goods, and we are not concerned about the corner solutions for these goods. The only non-negativity constraints considered here (i.e.
constraints 7 and 8) are on the amount of subsistence crop sold and the proportion of land in subsistence crop, to emphasize the corner solutions related to this crop that define shadow prices. Of special interest is Constraint 6, which is the market constraint for the farmer's subsistence crop (Q a ). Constraint 6 and the non-negativity constraints together determine the different regimes the farmer may be in (e.g. all land in Q a and subsistence farmer; all land in Q a and commercial farmer; some land in Q a and subsistence farmer...etc.), allowing us to derive farmer specific shadow prices of Q a for each case.
By substituting Equations 4 and 5 into the budget constraint, we obtain the following Lagrangean:
The first order conditions (FOC) for X h a , X c , X m , X l , L a and I a are:
Note that θ cannot be equal to zero, because that would require that the consumption of the subsistence crop -for which there is no perfect substitute -equaled to zero.
That,nevertheless, is ruled out above with the assumption that marginal utility of consumption goods evaluated at zero is very large. However, θ can be equal to one, where the farmer does not cultivate any cash crop, in which case L c and I c will automatically be zero.
4 To obtain the optimality conditions for X s a and θ including corner solutions, we need to use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions:
In an agricultural household model with perfect markets, the farmer equalizes the ratio of marginal utilities of each good to the ratio of market prices (i.e.
, and the value of marginal product of land across crops (i.e. p i M P A i = p j M P A j ). However, these conditions take the following forms in the current model (by Equations 9, 10 and 19):
where µ 1 λ takes the place of p a in the conventional optimality conditions. Given this optimization rule, I define the "shadow price" of X h a as follows:
where µ 1 is the marginal utility of having one more unit of Q a , and λ is the marginal utility of income. We can interpret ρ a as the money value of having one more unit of Q a for the household (Heckman, 1974) .
4 Note that the farmer still can have positive levels of consumption of cash crop that he can buy in the market. 5 The KKT conditions for L c and I c do not affect the discussion on shadow prices that follows. I discuss and interpret them in detail in Appendix.
Let us compare this interpretation with the interpretation of shadow wage in the labor supply literature. The shadow wage is defined as ω = µ λ , where µ is the shadow value of household's time constraint, and λ is the shadow value of income. Their ratio (i.e. shadow wage) represents the monetized value to the household of a one unit increase in total time endowment. Similarly, the shadow price represents the amount of additional income that would increase the household's utility by an amount equal to one more unit of subsistence crop production.
I discuss the different classes of farmers as defined by KKT conditions in detail in the Appendix. For farmers who have θ > 0 and sell part of their subsistence crop, the shadow price equals the market price, i.e. ρ a = p a = µ1 λ , and we can safely use the market price to represent the value of the this crop to farmers. If, however, the farmer is consuming all of Q a at home, the shadow price is greater than the market price, i.e.:
Production decisions are affected by µ 1 and λ, which depend on household characteristics that would not affect production under perfect markets. Although µ 1 and λ are not observable, we can define an estimable expression for ρ a by using Equations 13 and 14:
The model developed here is similar to the one in de Janvry et al. (1991) in that it is concerned with the shadow price of a "non-tradable" farm product. However, they assume perfect substitutability between farmer's product and the market product; therefore, the shadow price equals the market price whenever transaction costs do not constrain farmer's access to markets. The shadow price is implicit in their simulation and cannot be estimated production function to derive the marginal product of labor or the purchased input for each household. We can also test whether shadow prices are statistically different from market prices, and build empirical models to analyze the determinants of this difference to explore farmers' incentives to cultivate traditional crops associated with on-farm conservation.
In the next section, I estimate a production function for subsistence farmers and calculate the household specific shadow prices using the estimated marginal product of labor. I test whether the estimated shadow prices are statistically different from market prices, using the test for separability used by Jacoby (1993) and conclude that shadow prices are significantly higher from market prices for subsistence farmers of traditional maize. Then, I proceed with the analysis to identify regional patterns for shadow prices of traditional maize and the determinants of the difference between shadow and market prices in rural Mexico. fertilizer, animals and machinery used for agricultural production in 2002; total production; marketing and consumption of products; maize diversity; migration history; off-farm income sources; credit market participation and other assets.
Estimation and Decomposition of Shadow Prices
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The input data is collected at the plot level, which makes the estimation of a production function for maize difficult for plots with multiple crops. Therefore, in what follows I use a subsample of the plots that are cultivated only with maize, which constitutes 31% of all plots and 65% of maize plots in the whole sample. 85% of the plots used in this subsample are cultivated with traditional maize (Table 1 on includes states with higher GDP per capita, large scale farming and industrial production (Chiquiar, 2005) , where only 14% of plots are cultivated with traditional maize. Table 2 demonstrates the differences between regions using other variables. We can see that households in the South-Southeast and Central Regions are in the lower wealth quintiles, own less land and are more likely to belong to an indigenous community. In the 
Estimating the production function and shadow prices of traditional maize.
Descriptive statistics of data used for estimations are given in Table 3 . Estimating the production function only for traditional maize can cause selection bias if there are some unobservable variables that affect both farmers' crop choice and productivity (Vella, 1998) .
To correct for possible selection bias, I use the two step Heckman procedure to estimate the production function for traditional maize. In the first step we need to have at least one variable that affects selection into traditional maize farming but not productivity. I use two variables to identify the selection equation: the maximum years of education of household head's parents; and the percentage of total plots that are cultivated with traditional maize in the same village.
8 These variables are likely to affect farmers' choice of crops (i.e., whether he will choose to cultivate traditional maize or not) but not the production after this choice has been made. Farmers from educated families may be more likely to try modern maize varieties, but parent's education should not effect farmers production function once the crop choice is made. Also, if the farmer lives in a village where a high percentage of plots are cultivated with traditional maize, he will be more likely to cultivate traditional maize. But this variable should not affect farmers' production function after controlling for the village level correlation.
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The estimation results for the production function and the selection equation are given in Table 4 on the next page, where I use a Cobb-Douglas production function in the second step after correcting for zero inputs (i.e. adding 0.01 to zero inputs so that the logarithm is defined). 10 A widely cited problem with Cobb-Douglas production function estimates is the appearance negative marginal products (Barrett et al., 2005) , but all of the estimated marginal products for all factors of production estimated here are positive. The regression standard errors are clustered at the village level to correct for potential error correlation due to unobserved village characteristics that are common to all households. Because households have different number of plots in the data set, I weighted the observations using the reciprocal of the square root of the number of plots for each household, to ensure equal representation of all households in the sample.
8 This variable excludes the plots of the farmer to prevent endogeneity. 9 I have tested the validity of exclusion restrictions by regressing the predicted residuals from the second step equation on the two variables. Regression results indicate that the residuals in the production function equation are not correlated with either of the variables except through their impact on selection into traditional variety farming (i.e., very low R-squared and insignificant coefficients). 10 I have also estimated a production function with the more flexible Translog specification. The qualitative results are the same and the quantitative results do not change significantly. Moreover, the Bayesian Schwarz Information Criterion suggests a better fit for the Cobb Douglas form. I report the more tractable CobbDouglas results and use these estimates in obtaining the shadow prices. Using the estimated marginal product of labor and wages in the formula for shadow
), I calculate the shadow prices of traditional maize for each farmer.
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11 This formula essentially assumes that the labor market is perfect for the households in the sample, because it uses market wages to value their time. I have tested this assumption by estimating a production function with family labor and hired labor separated. I calculated the shadow wages for family labor and ran the test of separability as in Jacoby (1993) for farmers who sold some of their product in the market. I fail Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the estimated shadow prices and market prices of traditional maize in local markets. We can see that the average shadow price is higher than the average market price, and the shadow price for subsistence farmers is higher than that of farmers who sell some maize in the market. 
and testing the null hypothesis of:
There may be selection bias in Equation 27 if there are unobservables that increase the likelihood of selling maize for some farmers that are correlated with shadow prices. The possible selection bias could be controlled with panel data methods, however, given the lack of panel data, I use t-tests to see whether the distribution of some key variables, which are likely to cause selection bias, are different across subsistence and commercial farmers. I test the following variables: the time it takes to go to the market; tractor ownership; age and education. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of these variables are the same for the two groups of farmers and conclude that selection bias is not significant for this sample.
The null hypothesis in Equation 28 is rejected for both subsistence farmers and the commercial farmers by the F-test. However, individual t-tests (i.e. testing α = 0 and β = 1 separately) fail to reject both hypotheses only for farmers who sold some maize in to reject the separability hypothesis and conclude that shadow wages are not significantly different from market wages, hence use the market wage to value households' time.
the market. It is clear that subsistence farmers have significantly higher shadow prices than commercial farmers. We can conclude that the estimated shadow prices of traditional maize for subsistence farmers in the sample are significantly different from market prices. This result confirms that market prices do not fully capture the value of traditional maize for subsistence farmers in rural Mexico (Berthaud and Gepts, 2004; Dyer-Leal et al., 2002) .
Understanding the determinants of the wedge between these two sets of prices of traditional maize can provide important policy implications for conservation of the genetic diversity they maintain. Conservation programs can concentrate on the key variables that are correlated with the wedge between market and shadow prices to more efficiently allocate resources to on-farm and off-farm conservation. I analyze the determinants of this wedge in the following section.
What predicts high shadow prices?
The theoretical model developed in Section 3 shows that the shadow price depends on household characteristics, plot characteristics and indicators of market participation. We can now regress the wedge between shadow and market prices on these variables to understand the key factors that are correlated with it. I use the variables from previous studies that are shown to affect farmers' crop choice decisions and their valuation of traditional crops (Bellon and Smale, 1998; Van Dusen, 2000; Meng, 1997; Brush and Meng, 1998) . The regression results are given in Table 6 on the following page, where standard errors are clustered by household and village to control for possible error correlation across different plots of a household, and across households in the same village. Because the dependent variable is derived from a variable that is estimated with error, there is an additional source of variance in the standard errors of this estimation.
The test statistics will not be valid unless the standard errors are corrected (Dumont et al., 2005) . One way to correct for this bias is bootstrapping, and I report the bootstrapped regression results here (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) .
Household wealth, household head's age and education are among the variables shown to be positively correlated with cultivation of modern varieties at the expense of traditional varieties in the empirical literature (Feder and Umali, 1993; Bellon and Taylor, 1993) . However these variables are not significant in the current sample. Male farmers value traditional maize higher than females, indicating that among the non-market values, production characteristics, the value of being a good farmer and preserving the family seeds may be more important than the consumption characteristics (e.g. culinary superiority) women tend to care about.
Another variable in the literature often found to affect farmer's likelihood of conserving landraces is belonging to an indigenous group (Turrent and Serratos-Hernandez, 2004; Perales et al., 2005) . The coefficient on the indigenous language dummy is significant and positive, which confirms this finding. The non-market values of traditional maize captured in shadow prices are higher for indigenous farmers, which underlines their role as stewards of genetic diversity.
The variables that represent market performance in the farmer's village include; total remittances received, the percentage of farmers who have off farm income, and the percentage of farmers who have some kind of credit in the same village. None of these variables significantly affect the difference between shadow and market prices. This finding indicates that farmer valuation of traditional maize varieties does not decrease with improved access to off-farm labor, credit and migration markets, which restores hopes for de-facto conservation of maize landraces.
Previous studies mostly find that the transaction cost of going to the nearest market is negatively correlated with on-farm diversity (Bellon and Taylor, 1993; Meng, 1997; Van Dusen, 2000; Smale et al., 1994) . The results confirm this with a positive and significant coefficient on the time it takes farmers to walk from their plots to the community center. The more isolated the farmers' plots, the higher the shadow price. Irrigation and high soil quality are negatively correlated with shadow prices. A more effective way of conserving the genetic diversity in such areas may be off-farm conservation rather than on-farm conservation.
Programs for on-farm conservation of genetic diversity of maize in Mexico will be more cost effective if targeted at isolated communities with indigenous populations where defacto conservation is more likely. More resources may be needed in regions where irrigation projects are being developed or programs to improve soil quality exist. The potential negative effects of such projects on traditional maize cultivation in areas of diversity can be counteracted with additional programs to increase farmers' incentives to maintain traditional varieties, such as conservation payments, or programs to create niche markets to increase the market value of traditional maize varieties.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, I developed a theoretical model to derive estimable shadow prices for non-marketed crops in an agricultural household setting. This model allows us to econometrically analyze the determinants of the difference between shadow prices and market prices, which reflects farmers' incentives for growing subsistence crops. Understanding the factors that make farmers value traditional crops more than market prices has important policy implications for the conservation of genetic diversity in landraces.
Using a nationally representative household data from rural Mexico, I estimated householdspecific shadow prices of traditional maize varieties for farmers. Shadow prices are significantly higher than market prices for subsistence farmers of traditional maize in the sample.
Among the significant determinants of this difference are being gender, ethnicity, isolation, access to irrigation, and soil quality. These determinants can be used as guides to efficiently allocate public and private funds for the conservation of traditional maize varieties in Mexico and other crops elsewhere.
